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The purpose of this paper is to provide reasonable estimates for the welfare cost of 
environmental tax reform in the US economy. Unlike most previous studies that 
empirically evaluate the deadweight cost of taxation, the model employed here considers 
explicitly the joint allocation of leisure and commodity demands where the wage rate 
plays a role both as a form of income and as the price of leisure time. The estimated 
results of the consumer behavior model indicate that the existing US gasoline tax regime 
has induced a decrease of gasoline consumption by approximately 4% over the period 
from 1959 to 1999, while the deadweight cost caused by the tax accounts just for about 
0.08% of the consumer full income over the sample period 1959-1999. Moreover, in most 
years of the sample period, the measures of marginal deadweight cost of gasoline taxation 
(sample average 0.1882) are relatively small compared to those of labor taxation (sample 
average 0.2175). This implies a larger efficiency gain in the case of labor taxation in 
shifting from the existing distortionary taxation to lump sum taxation. These empirical 
results might suggest the modest possibility of social welfare gains from tax reforms that 
would shift some of the burden of taxation from labor to energy (e.g., gasoline).  
Key words: Environmental taxes, double dividend hypothesis, gasoline taxation, non-
separable labor supply effects, AI demand system, marginal deadweight cost 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have greatly increased attention on the question of whether it is possible 
to use environmental taxes to improve the distorted tax system a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
environmental quality.
1  Recently this question often arises in the context of measuring 
the welfare consequences of the revenue-neutral tax swap between corrective commodity 
taxation and pre-existing distortionary (labor) income taxation. In this case, the welfare 
effects of cutting one tax at the expense of raising another tax, holding total tax revenues 
constant, depend critically on the magnitude of marginal deadweight loss of each of these 
taxes.  
As indicated by Pearce (1991), energy-related taxes might offer a so-called “double 
dividend”: these taxes not only might improve the environment, but might also reduce 
welfare costs of the overall tax system.
2 However, the literature on the double dividend 
hypothesis was dramatically reframed by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Parry (1995), 
Oates (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and many other authors: in a tax system 
with a labor income tax, the second-best optimal pollution tax typically lies below the 
first-best Pigouvian level (or social marginal damages). These recent contributions have 
claimed that by raising costs and prices, new environmental taxes decrease the real net 
return to labor and therefore aggravates the distortions of pre-existing taxes. In other 
words, with other distortionary taxes, environmental regulatory instruments tend to 
compound those pre-existing distortions, a cost that is recognized as “tax interactions” or 
“interdependency effects.” According to these interpretations, pre-existing distortions 
significantly raise the costs of all environmental policies relative to their costs in a first-
best setting. Thus, the pessimism remains, with a fairly general presumption against the 
possibility of double dividends.  
However, we should note that this prior literature is based on a fairly simple model 
with narrow assumptions and special cases. In particular, these models typically assume 
weakly separable and homothetic preference structure, which implies that all 
consumption goods have the same substitutability with leisure and consumer demands for 
individual types of commodity are required to be proportional to total expenditure.
3 
Therefore, if we relax this separability assumption in the utility of the representative 
                                                           
1 The problem of whether (and when) a revenue-neutral tax policy can increase welfare might be a leading 
concern for corrective policy decision-makers. 
 
2 In general, the environmental benefit is called the first dividend and the non-environmental benefit the 
second dividend. This “double dividend” issue is reviewed at length in Goulder (1995) and Oates (1995).  
 
3 Recall that the pioneering findings by Sandmo (1975) demonstrate that the optimal second-best tax on an 
externality-generating good is a weighted average of a Ramsey component and a Pigouvian component 
(i.e., marginal environmental damages). So, recent results can be considered a re-interpretation of the well-
known Ramsey uniform taxation literature under homothetic separability with a Pigouvian corrective tax. 
The reason is that any deviation from uniform commodity taxation under this assumption would always 
increase the efficiency cost of the tax system from a non-environmental point of view. 
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consumer, the welfare implications of environmental tax reform might not be so skeptical 
as the literature has argued.
4   
The question of the environmental tax debate above can be addressed only by the 
empirical welfare measurement of the relevant effective policy effects, taking into 
account the realistic behavioral responses. One of the common empirical approaches to 
the evaluation of such a policy is to measure the (aggregate) deadweight loss that results 
from the introduction of tax distortion into an economic system. The measure of 
aggregate deadweight loss, as an index of potential welfare change, would be necessary 
for evaluating the possibilities of social welfare gains from alternative tax policy regimes. 
Previous studies have tended to estimate separately the deadweight costs of income 
taxation and individual commodity taxation. In such cases, they assumed separation of 
the consumer’s labor-leisure decision from the consumption expenditure allocation over 
individual goods.
5 However, note that the joint modeling of leisure and goods demand 
would be of critical importance in dealing with transitions between labor income taxes 
and environmentally-motivated consumption taxes. As long as leisure is not separable 
from consumption goods, the conventional separation of labor supply modeling from 
consumer demand modeling could result in misleading conclusions regarding any welfare 
costs estimates from distiortionary taxation.      
In reality, the major source of energy-related or environmental taxes within the 
household sector in the U.S. is through taxes on consumption of motor fuels such as 
gasoline.  It accounts for about 15 percent of total excise taxes revenue by government.  
Therefore, to assess the welfare implications of environmentally-motivated taxation, this 
paper has focused the following questions: how does gasoline tax affect the consumer 
behavior? what is the corresponding deadweight loss of such a tax?  and what is the 
welfare consequences of gasoline tax compared to ordinary income taxes such as labor 
tax? 
6  
To answer each of these questions, this paper is organized as follows. Using time-
series data over the period 1959-1999 in the U.S. economy, first, this paper estimates 
econometrically a complete demand system of consumer behavior that accounts for the 
non-separable effects of labor supply on individual commodity demands.
7 Then, based 
on the estimated model of consumer demand responsiveness (i.e., a joint allocation of 
                                                           
4  As in much of the recent literature, this paper considers the representative shift from labor income 
(abstracting capital income part) to environmental taxes or energy-related taxes.  
 
5 For example, see Stuart (1984), Ballard et al. (1985), Browning (1987, 1994), Feldstein (1999) for income 
taxation, and  Slesnick (1991) for commodity-specific taxation. 
 
6 For a similar study, see Jorgenson et al. (1992). They examined the efficiency and equity impacts of a 
carbon tax in the U.S. with an econometric general equilibrium model. However, for this paper, we abstract 
from the distributional considerations in order to focus on the possibility of double dividend in the context 
of efficiency aspects with non-separable household labor supply effects by environmental taxation.  
 
7 In this case, unlike the conventional model with homothetically separable aggregate consumption in the 
preference structure, we can obtain information on expenditure and price elasticities for goods and the 
effects of changes in labor supply on individual consumption patterns. However, most papers on empirical 
welfare measurement of taxation lack this information, thereby providing misleading conclusions on the 
optimal tax structure.  
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individual demands and labor supply equations with flexible functional forms), this paper 
evaluates the commodity-specific deadweight loss of taxation on gasoline and labor. 




II. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF NON-SEPARABLE UTILITY  
Since the responsiveness of consumer behavior to changes in after-tax prices is the 
main determinant of the size of welfare costs, it is important in evaluating environmental 
tax reforms how we set out the assumptions on preference structure and how we obtain 
the unbiased estimates of the key preference parameters.
9 In fact, the magnitude of the 
deadweight cost of distortionary taxes critically depends on the estimated parameter 
values for the structure of consumer preferences. Only unbiased estimates can correctly 
address the welfare effect of tax-reform induced changes. Yet, most empirical studies 
using a system of consumer demands are still based on (weakly) separable preferences 
between commodity demands and labor supply, and even linear Engel curves together. 
Without clear evidence that labor supply and commodity demands are separable, any 
welfare cost estimates from demand systems that ignore the interaction between 
household labor supply and commodity demands are likely to be seriously biased.  As 
implied in Corlett and Hague (1953), Sandmo (1976), and Hanemann and Morey (1992), 
the separability restriction can result in misleading conclusions concerning the impact of 
price changes on welfare, because changes in the prices and expenditure bring about 
overall reallocations between labor supply and individual consumption patterns. 
The null hypothesis of separability of leisure from consumption is usually rejected 
in the econometric literature (for a recent survey on the non-separability issue in 
empirical welfare measurement, see Slesnick (1998)).
10  Evidence presented by Abbot 
and Ashenfelter (1976), Barnett (1979), Blundell and Walker (1982), and Browning and 
Meghir (1991) does not support the separable labor supply effects from commodity 
demand patterns. In this case, labor-leisure choice affects the demand patterns for 
individual consumption goods, and, at the same time, changes in the reallocation of 
consumption goods expenditure give feedback effects on leisure demand.   
However, as pointed out in Fullerton and Gravelle (1998) and Parry (1998), most 
previous analyses on the environmental tax reform have neglected the non-separable 
labor supply effects on household demand patterns.
 Examples that assume the separable 
labor supply include Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996, 
                                                           
8 However, the truth regarding the welfare implications of environmental tax reforms could come to us 
more closely, if we incorporate the distributional concerns with a heterogeneous household framework, as 
in Slesnick (1991). Considering that distortionary income taxes are used because of individual diversity, the 
next step of this study would be clear. 
 
9  According to Stuart (1984), Ballard (1990), and Fullerton (1991), major sources of differences in 
estimates of marginal excess burden may stem from differences in underlying model structure assumptions 
rather than uncertainty about the magnitude of various elasticities.  
 
10  Normatively, the non-separable structure of consumer preferences might shed some light on the 
desirability of differential as opposed to uniform commodity taxation.   
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1997), Goulder et al (1997), and Parry et al (1999).
 11  So, these models are subject to 
some severe limitations: private consumption commodities are weakly separable from 
leisure so that changes in labor supply do not affect the allocation of consumption over 
different commodities, and, more critically, the sub-utility function for aggregate 
consumption is homothetic in its arguments, which implies the linear Engel curves and 
also all the unitary expenditure elasticities for private consumption commodities. In 
addition, the elasticity estimates employed in these models are often from separate 
empirical studies that are undertaken for different purposes.
12      
Nonetheless, the previous literature on empirical public finance pays little attention 
to how the non-separable labor supply affects the welfare cost measurement of the 
corrective policy instruments. Especially, this consideration is of great significance for 
the empirical explorations of the ‘double dividend’ issue in the context of measuring the 
welfare consequences of taxes on interaction between corrective commodity market and 
tax-distorted labor market. The reason is that the marginal deadweight loss of energy-
related taxes could also depend on how these taxes interacts with pre-existing tax 
distortions in labor market in the economy with non-separable structure of consumer 
preferences.  
As indicted in Diewert et al (1998), in general, economists have presumed that the 
deadweight costs of taxation might be minimized by lower marginal tax rates on good 
things (e.g., working, saving, or investing), by broadening tax bases, by taxing bad things 
(e.g., pollution, tobacco, or alcohol).  In a recent study by Ballard et al. (2000), using a 
simple CGE model with two final goods (clean and dirty) and the only input labor as 
corresponded in the analytical model of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), they report the 
strong and wide possibility of double dividends when utility function is separable 
between goods and leisure but the inner nest of the utility function is assumed not to be 
homothetic. Their study indicates that for even a modest amount of non-homotheticity 
component, Bovenberg and de Mooij’s result can be reversed dramatically.  As another 
example, an econometric CGE model for New Zealand by Diewert and Lawrence (1996) 
also indicates the marginal excess benefit (or negative deadweight loss) of tax on motor 
vehicles (which is pollution-intensive and leisure-intensive good) in the presence of other 
taxes. 
 
III.  DATA  
 
The data set employed in the empirical work consist of annual aggregate time series 
for the United States on personal consumption expenditures, hours of work, money wage 
                                                           
11 In contrast, some few exceptions are made recently in Kim (2002) who generalizes theoretically founded 
and operational environmental taxation formulas in a second-best world of other existing policy distortions, 
and shows that, sharply contrary to the impression given by the prior literature, the degree of pre-existing 
tax distortions does not affect the possibility of whether second-best pollution tax is below or above the 
first-best Pigouvian level. 
 
12 The results of unwarranted parameter uses would be even more severe, if the parameter estimates are 
incompatibly mixed from heterogeneous studies for different time periods and different countries. 
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rates, and nonlabor income covering the years 1959-1999. Since the purpose of this study 
centers on the interaction of commodity prices and wage rates in the joint determination 
of both commodity demand and labor supply, we are precluded from the use of purely 
cross-sectional data sets where price variation is typically ignored. Further, this study, 
encompassing labor-leisure choice as well as choice among commodities, abstracts from 
demographic characteristics among consumer units and any distributional consequences 
from environmental taxes.
13  
The personal consumption expenditure data are compiled from Table 2.6U, 2.7U and 
7.5U of the NIPA and combined into the following four mutually exclusive composite 
commodities: 
 
1.  Gasoline and other fuels (O) – expenditures on gasoline, fuel oil, and other fuels 
including coals, and so on, for transportation, heating, and operation of tools such as 
power motors. 
2.  Natural gas (G) –  expenditures on natural gas for heating and use of appliances  
3.  Electricity (EL) – expenditures on electricity for lighting, heating, and use of 
appliances. 
4. Non-energy products (N) – expenditures on non-energy aggregates such as food, 
clothing, other consumer goods and services, and non-durables.
14  
 
The price series of commodities are formed by division of the current-dollar 
composite by the Divisia index for the corresponding constant-dollar composite. As a 
matter of style, the term ‘full income’ as our income variable is used to designate 
aggregate consumption expenditure on commodities and leisure. Its use is dictated by the 
intertemporal separability assumption required to acquire a single period decision in a 
multiperiod world. The average hourly pre-tax wage rate (w) is estimated by dividing 
total wages and salaries in the private sector from Table 2.8M and 2.9M of the NIPA by 
an estimate of total private hours worked from the BLS. The value of leisure is defined as 
average hourly after-tax wage rate multiplied by the nonwork (or nonmarket) hours of all 
working age groups.
15 The time endowment (T) of 2400 hours per year is assumed and 
hence per capita leisure is calculated as 2400−L where L is per capita hours of work 
supplied by the representative consumer unit during the year under consideration.   
                                                           
13 This will require the recognition of heterogeneity of abilities of different consumers (or earning persons) 
and their differential wage rates, which is one promising opportunity for extending the econometric model 
in this paper as well as for incorporating inter-temporal choice of endogenous saving.  
 
14 Note that the data on consumer durables (included in the non-energy products) – treated as investment 
altering the stock of household capital as well as replacement – is taken directly from the NIPA personal 
consumption expenditure. However, on theoretical grounds, it would be more valid to use the service flow 
from consumer durables such as the data via the ‘perpetual inventory method’ described in Christensen and 
Jorgenson (1970).  
 
15 Due to the deficiency of some data on the hours of government employees and exact labor taxes on 
personal income, this study assumed that  i) hours of work per employee are similar in the government and 
private sectors, ii)  marginal and average tax rates are equal, and iii) both earned and unearned income is 
taxed at similar rates.  
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Table-1 contains summary statistics on the series for the consumption data for the 
three main composite commodity groups and for the three individual types of energy 
products. Due to the reduction in work hours within the period, the relative share of 
leisure in full income has been slightly increased. This trend may partly accounts for 
the increased personal income effects. There is also a relatively large increase in 
nominal wage rate compared to in other commodity groups, even though the U.S 
economy experienced a rapid participation of female workers after 1971. The average 
growth rate in the price of energy products is slightly higher than that of non-energy 
products.  About 60 percent of total household expenditure on energy products is 
allocated to the expenditure on gasoline and other fuel oils. The dominant tend in 
individual types of energy is the continued increase in electricity consumption.  
  
 Table-1. Sample Statistics for Consumption and Leisure Data in the U.S. 
  Commodity categories 
Shares in 
full expenditure  
Sample means of 
(natural) log changes
 1959  1999  Sample  mean ∆Log  Pi 
      Non-energy (N)  0.8250  0.8129  0.7988  0.0393 
      Energy (E)  0.0642  0.0368  0.0566  0.0396 
      Leisure (R)  0.1108  0.1503  0.1446  0.0572 
  Energy categories 
Shares in 
Total energy expenditure 
Sample means of 
(natural) log changes
 1959  1999  Sample  mean ∆log  Pi 
      Gasoline/fuel oils (O)  0.6673  0.5256  0.5836  0.0382 
      Natural gas (G)  0.1275  0.1204  0.1336  0.0479 
      Electricitity (EL)  0.2052  0.3541  0.2828  0.0363 
Sources:  Tables 2.6U, 2.7U, and 7.5U of NIPA, and the data on labor hours estimates of BLS 
   
IV.  ESTIMATION OF RELATIVE PRICE AND INCOME EFFECTS 
     4-1. AIDS Model of Consumer behavior 
The household sector in the U.S. consumes energy as a final good for transport, 
lighting, heating, and use of appliances, and so on. Household behavior in this study is 
analyzed a complete system of demand functions, describing how the demand for a 
specific good changes when the price of some good, or the income, changes. The system 
of demand functions is derived by assuming utility-maximization over full household 
consumption that includes leisure, energy and all non-energy commodities.  
The model used here is a ‘two-stage budgeting’ model which use aggregate data 
from the national income and product accounts. The advantage of this approach is that at 
each stage, the number of commodity groups can be kept relatively small. The 
observations on aggregate consumer behavior in the model include the US time-series 
data 1959-1999 on expenditure shares and prices for leisure, individual types of energy, 
and all other non-energy commodities. The first stage concerns the allocation of full 
expenditure among the three broad categories: leisure (R), energy (E) and non-energy 
aggregates (N). The second stage incorporates the allocation of total energy expenditure       Environmental Taxes and Economic Welfare: The Welfare Cost of Gasoline Taxation in the U.S. 
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among the three individual types of energy: gasoline and other fuels (O), natural gas (G), 
and electricity (EL).  
The model in this study, however, is distinct from the majority of the U.S. empirical 
two-stage budgeting studies. Most previous studies in this area have been abstract from 
(or treating separately) leisure demand, without taking into account the non-separable 
labor supply effects from consumption patterns. An important feature of the consumer 
behavior model in this study is that commodity demands need not be separable from 
leisure and also not be homothetic. At levels of full expenditure and total energy 
expenditure increase, individual consumption patterns and labor supply incentive would 
change, even in the absence of relative price changes.
16  The modeling feature of non-
separable structure of consumer preferences enables us to capture critical channels for 
interactions between energy taxation and labor income taxation, which is typically 
ignored in most empirical tax incidence analyses.    
Formally, it is assumed that the representative consumer expenditures on leisure and 
commodities are distributed according to an AIDS (See Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, 
p.313). The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) assumes that consumer preferences 
fall within the PIGLOG (price-independent generalized logarithmic) class so that exact 
aggregation over consumers is possible. This means that the expenditures on a specific 
commodity, or group of commodities, in relation to full expenditures, can be written as: 
 
                    ∑ + + + + =
j
i i i j ij i i T P y p w ε η β γ α ) / ln( ln ,                           (1) 
where wi  is commodity  i ’s share of full expenditure, pj is a price for commodity j, y is 
income which in this case equals full expenditure, P is the ‘consumer price index’, T is 
time index of taste change, and εi is the random element. The parameters to be estimated 
are then α, β and γ.       
The consumer price index, P, is determined simultaneously with the expenditure 
shares, but here used as an approximation, the well-known Stone (1953)’s index which is 
expressed  
                                 ∑ =
j
j j p w P ln ln ,                                                               (2) 
which simply implies that the price level on full consumption equals a weighted average 
of leisure and all commodities prices where the weight equals the expenditure share of 
each commodity.  
In the AIDS model with two-stage budgeting process, we have six different 
equations in (1) for R, E, and N within the first stage and for O, G, and EL within the 
second stage. To satisfy the regular requirements by consumer theory, the complete 
demand system need to hold the following conditions (3), (4), and (5). These conditions 
are (i) adding-up condition (i.e, sum of the expenditure shares equals one), (ii) no money 
illusion or homogeneity condition (i.e., demands are homogenous of degree zero in all 
prices and income, and all prices are expressed relative to the price of “other” goods), and 
(iii) symmetry condition in the usual way: 
                                                           
16 If individual types of energy are homothetcally separable from non-energy commodities, then consumer 
demands for individual types of energy at the second-stage are required to be proportional to total energy 
expenditure (e.g., Jorgenson, Slesnick, and Stoker, 1988).   
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i η γ β α ,                           (3) 
                           ∑ =
j
ij 0 γ ,  and                                             (4)                               
                             ji ij γ γ = .                            (5)                               
 
To calculate AIDS model elasticities, differentiate (1) with respect to prices and 
income. Then, under regular restrictions, the income (budget) elasticities are given by      
 
                            1 / + = i i i w e β .                                                                          (6) 
 
The uncompensated price elasticities are given by  
 
                           ij i j i ij
u
ij w w e δ β γ − − = / ) ( ,                                                       (7) 
 




ij w e e e + = , we 
further get the compensated price elastictities. 
Since all six equations in the first and second stage model are derived from the same 
utility function, the whole system can be estimated simultaneously in the efficient 
manner, with all the restrictions implied by (3), (4), and (5).   
 
4-2. Empirical Results 
The estimation results from the U.S. data for the period 1959-1999 are shown in 
Table-2. The results indicate that most of the estimated parameters in the first and second 
stage in the model are significantly different from zero and that the degree of explanation 
is good. These results are used to estimate income (or expenditure) and price elasticities 
for the demand of the various goods according to (6) and (7), which are presented in 
Table-3 through Table-5.  
Table-3 and Table-4 show that all own-price elasticities have a negative sign, which 
indicates that a price increase of one specific good has a negative effect on the same 
good. In this case, own-price elasticities between 0 and -1 implies that a higher price of 
one good increases its budget share in spite of lower consumption of that good.    
According to Table-3, if the price of energy consumption goods increases by 10 
percent, everything remaining constant, then energy consumption decreases with 
approximately 1.16 percent.  With considerable precision, all goods have positive 
aggregate (full) income elasticities, so that all goods are normal goods including leisure.  
Especially, aggregate energy has the smallest income elasticity, 0.62, of three broad 
commodity groups. That is, if income, more precisely full expenditure, increases by 1 
percent, then demand for aggregate energy increases by 0.62 percent.  One interpretation 
is that energy seems to be a necessary good for the U.S. consumers.     
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The own-price elasticities of demand for all three types of energy calculated from 
second-stage model are presented in Table-4.  All own-price elasticities within the energy 
nest have a negative sign, where gasoline and fuel oil is the greatest in absolute value.  
Natural gas is least elastic among three types of energy, to account for its major use for 
residential heating and cooking. This result also shows that for the U.S. consumers, 
energy use for transportation is more price-responsive than that for heating and other 
appliances. The price effects for aggregate energy and for individual types of energy 
presented in Table-4 implies that energy-related or environmentally-targeted taxes can 
have the intended effect in the sense that a higher tax reduces energy consumption in the 
U.S. economy.  
 
     Table-2. Demand System Parameter Estimates for the Period 1959-1999 
 
 
                                                                                               Full consumption 
                                    
                                                    Constant          ln PN         ln PE         ln PR       ln (y/ P)          T 
 
     Non-energy products (N)        0.7337         0.2353     -0.0863     -0.1490      0.0101       0.0018   
                                                    (0.0186)       (0.0537)   (0.0056)    (0.0317)    (0.0508)   (0.0007)                   
     Energy products (E)                0.0819        -0.0863      0.0454      0.0409     -0.0208     -0.0011                 
                                                    (0.0064)       (0.0056)   (0.0029)   (0.0071)    (0.0128)    (0.0002)         
     Leisure (R)                              0.1844        -0.1490      0.0409      0.1081      0.0107      -0.0007       
                                                    (0.0171)       (0.0317)   (0.0071)   (0.0352)    (0.0491)    (0.0001)  
 
 
                                                                                            Energy consumption 
                                    
                                                    Constant          ln Po         ln PG      ln PEL     ln (yE / PE)        T 
 
     Gasoline/ Fuel oil  (O)           0.6690          0.1719     -0.0634     -0.1085      0.0288      -0.0041   
                                                   (0.0454)       (0.0835)    (0.0131)    (0.0306)   (0.0791)    (0.0012)                               
     Natural Gas (G)                     0.1683         -0.0634      0.0797      -0.0163     0.0029      -0.0012                 
                                                   (0.0186)        (0.0131)   (0.0172)    (0.0184)   (0.0248)     (0.0005)         
     Electricity (EL)                     0.1627         -0.1085      -0.0163      0.1248    -0.0317       0.0053        
                                                   (0.0473)       (0.0306)   (0.0184)    (0.0438)   (0.0825)     (0.0013) 
 
     Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Convergence achieved after five iterations. The logarithm of  




   Table-3. Elasticities Estimates of Commodity and Leisure Demand 
 
 
                                                           Own-price elasticity                         Income (or expenditure)      
                                             Uncompensated             Compensated                         elasticity 
 
     Non-energy products (N)       -0.7155                        -0.1421                               1.0126   
                                                     (0.0232)                       (0.0198)                            (0.0103)                               
     Energy products (E)               -0.1517                        -0.1157                               0.6215   
                                                     (0.0914)                       (0.0862)                            (0.0738)                               
     Leisure (R)                             -0.2441                        -0.0896                                1.0762   
                                                     (0.1144)                       (0.0554)                            (0.0114)                               
 
      Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 




Table-4. Elasticities Estimates of Individual Types of Energy 
 
 
                                                           Own-price elasticity                         Total energy expenditure      
                                             Uncompensated             Compensated                         elasticity 
 
     Gasoline/ Fuel oil  (O)            -0.1659                        -0.1257                               1.0771   
                                                     (0.0243)                       (0.0169)                            (0.0078)                               
     Natural Gas (G)                      -0.0598                        -0.0461                               1.0337   
                                                     (0.0311)                       (0.0256)                            (0.0026)                               
     Electricity (EL)                       -0.0801                       -0.0611                                0.8179   
                                                     (0.0134)                       (0.0207)                            (0.0354)                               
 
      Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table-5. Elasticities Estimates of Labor Supply 
 
 
                                                                           Price elasticity                             Income      
                                                         Uncompensated        Compensated              elasticity 
 
     Labor supply (L)                             0.0819                       0.2365                     -0.3613  
                                                            (0.0384)                    (0.0575)                    (0.0038)                                    
 
      Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
The consumer behavior model which has been used in this study incorporates the 
nonseparable labor supply effects from individual types of commodity demands. Thus, 
the energy demand and economic policy impacts evaluated from the consumer behavior 
model in this study would be distinct from those from empirical energy demand studies 
which do not take into account the interactions between individual types of energy, other 
goods, and labor supply.      
 
 
V. WELFARE EFFECTS OF ENERGY TAXATION 
 
In general, taxes create deadweight losses by distorting economic behavior. In this 
case, the welfare cost of taxation measures the value of the opportunities that are lost 
when taxes divert economic resources from their best uses. The behavioral changes 
caused by taxation can occur, for example, at willingness to work and choices among 
different consumption goods. In the spirit of Hicksian equilvalent variation, the 
deadweight loss, as a measure of money value of the behavioral changes, can be 
considered to be the amount in excess of the revenue collected that consumers would be 
willing to pay to shift from distortionary taxation to lump sum taxation.
17  
                                                           
17 This was originally defined by Mohring (1971) and discussed more in Auerbach (1985).   
 




1 be the potential level of social welfare in our representative 
consumer economy before and after the imposition of taxes, respectively. The monetary 
equivalent social welfare change, caused by changes in prices from the pre-tax level p
0 to 
the post-tax level p





1), evaluated at the same level of post-tax utility for each 
period. Then, the measure of aggregate deadweight loss from taxation is defined as: 
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where R is the tax revenue collected when prices are at p
1 and the consumer’s full income 
level equals F.  As noted in Mohring (1971), Auerbach (1985) and Slesnick (1991), this 
measure of the aggregate deadweight loss is the amount, in excess of the compensated tax 
revenue collected, the consumer would be willing to pay at existing prices to forgo all 
taxes.   From (9), the commodity-specific marginal deadweight loss (attributable to the 
taxation of the ith commodity) is also defined to be the additional excess burden that 
results from increasing tax revenue by a dollar by raising the tax rate on the ith 
commodity:    
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One of the main motivations for estimating complete consumer demand system is to 
facilitate welfare analysis. Estimates of the demand system parameters in previous 
section enables us to evaluate the level of aggregate and marginal deadweight loss due to 
gasoline and labor taxation over the period from 1959 to 1999 in the U.S. economy.
18 The 
difference in the deadweight loss, abstracting from the marginal environmental damages 
from gasoline consumption, of gasoline and labor taxation would critically determine the 
scope for revenue neutral tax reforms from labor tax to gasoline tax.  
Time series data on gasoline tax rates are obtained by taxes on “Motor Fuel” from 
various issues of the Tax Foundation’s Facts and Figures on Government Finance that 
includes the federal, state and local levels for the U.S economy.  However, it seems not 
simple to estimate the labor tax.  To approximate the average rate of labor taxation in the 
U.S., this study followed the procedure in Mendoza et al. (1994) using various issues of 
the OECD’s Revenue Statistics and National Accounts.
19  
 
                                                           
18 The ‘gasoline tax’ in this study really represents a more general tax on all petroleum-based fuels used in 
transportation, including jet and diesel fuels.   
 
19 Here, the average rate of tax on labor income (tL) is given by:  
 
                                    tL = (th*W+2000+5000) / (W+2200),  
 
where th is average personal income tax rate, W is wages and salaries, 2000 is national insurance 
contributions, 5000 is taxes on goods and services, netting out excises on gasoline and other fuels, and 
2200 is employer’s contribution to national insurance.  See, for a detail, Mendoza et al. (1994). 
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      Table-6. Effective Tax Rates for Gasoline and Labor Income (in Percent)  
Year  Gasoline*  Labor Income** 
1959  32.50  23.68 
1960  35.32  24.42 
1961  38.48  24.21 
1962  38.72  24.60 
1963  39.07  25.19 
1964  39.58  23.90 
1965  38.30  23.40 
1966  37.86  25.86 
1967  37.33  26.54 
1968  37.09  27.02 
1969  37.22  28.24 
1970  39.11  26.46 
1971  39.10  26.00 
1972  39.81  27.41 
1973  37.49  27.95 
1974  30.34  28.59 
1975  27.70  26.89 
1976  26.26  27.52 
1977  25.44  27.92 
1978  24.60  28.70 
1979  19.83  29.56 
1980  15.55  28.93 
1981  13.94  28.84 
1982  15.53  28.23 
1983  16.83  27.68 
1984  22.78  27.71 
1985  24.27  29.75 
1986  30.06  28.17 
1987  31.03  28.40 
1988  32.43  28.38 
1989  30.33  29.04 
1990  27.56  30.27 
1991  33.30  30.69 
1992  36.57  30.45 
1993  37.24  31.03 
1994  42.16  30.71 
1995  40.80  31.10 
1996  36.93  31.61 
1997  37.59  32.12 
1998  44.26  32.65 
1999  42.59  33.17 
    Notes: * The tax rate is assumed to be the ratio of the total motor fuel tax paid to aggregate 
                            motor fuel expenditure. 
            ** Assuming that both earned and unearned income is taxed at similar rates, the effective  
                 (average) labor income tax rate incorporates national insurance contribution, even  
                 though excises on gasoline is solely netted out of taxes on goods and services.   
            Sources:  Facts and Figures on Government Finance, Tax Foundation; NIPA  (Table 2.8M and 
                 Table 2.9M), BEA; and Revenue Statistics and National Accounts, OECD.        Environmental Taxes and Economic Welfare: The Welfare Cost of Gasoline Taxation in the U.S. 
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The time series data on the level of gasoline and labor taxation in the econometric 
consumer behavior model are presented in Table-6. According to Table-6, due to the 
large increase in the before-tax price of the two oil crises, the tax rate on gasoline 
dramatically declines over the period from 1973 to 1982. However, it increases steadily 
until 1999, reflecting a greater concern of environmental problems. Labor income tax 
burden appears to be relatively stable but it follows a slightly increasing trend over the 
sample period.    
In evaluating the welfare effects of taxation, the following three things in this study 
should be kept in mind.  First, since leisure is not separable from the goods consumption, 
labor and gasoline taxation can affect each other in the model, which is distinct from 
most of the previous studies that assumes separability between goods and leisure.
20 
Second, however, producer prices in this model are assumed fixed and thus the general 
equilibrium effects are ignored  due to abstracting from the producer behavior.   Third, in 
this study, the measures of aggregate deadweight loss attributable to the existing tax 
structure should be interpreted as an indicator of loss in allocative efficiency in our 
representative economy rather than a true measure of social welfare.  
To discuss the environmental performance of energy taxes, it is of great importance 
to know how these taxes will affect the demand for the goods that generate pollutions in 
their use.  Gasoline is a typical example of the pollution-generating consumption goods. 
The price increase for gasoline due to taxation has an effect on not only the gasoline itself 
but also on all other goods to consume, taking into account all own- and cross-price 












1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
Year
                   Figure-1.  Effects of Gasoline Tax on Gasoline Consumption and Welfare 
 
                                                           
20 In this case, the impact of (labor) income taxation on the deadweight loss due to commodity-specific 
taxation can be taken into account. 
 
Change in Gasoline Consumption   
                 (in %/100) 
Ratio of Deadweight Loss to Full Income 
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Figure-1 illustrates the effects of gasoline taxation on gasoline consumption and 
welfare spanning over the period from 1959 to 1999 without any tax replacement. The 
horizontal axis represents the years within the sample period. On the vertical axis, under 
the actual tax regime, we have the gasoline consumption change in terms of percent/100.  
Also, the deadweight cost of gasoline taxation, as a welfare index, is presented in terms 
of monetary value compared to the full income level.   
In Figure-1, we can see that the actual gasoline tax has led to a decrease of the 
gasoline consumption by approximately 4 percent over the period from 1959 to 1999. At 
the same time, the deadweight loss caused by the tax has occupied around 0.08 percent of 
the full income with a similar trend over the sample period. The measures of aggregate 
deadweight loss indicates the monetary measures of the changes in social welfare that 
would result if the existing gasoline tax is replaced with an equal yield lump sum tax. In 
particular, the deadweight loss per full income significantly decreases over the period 
from 1973 to 1981. The reason for this is due to a higher decline in the existing tax rate, 
reflecting the large increase in the pre-tax price of crude oil price experienced over the 
same period. However, it also corresponds to a smaller potential for the decrease of 
gasoline consumption in the environmental point of view.




































                                                           
21 The principle dividend of gasoline taxation could remain the environmental dividend. In this case, the 
economic performance of gasoline taxation should involve the welfare benefits attributable to decreases in 
gasoline consumption. This consideration would be of critical importance if the major purpose of energy-
related taxation entails the improvement of environmental quality through the internalization of 
environmental costs.  
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The various measures of deadweight loss attributable to the existing gasoline and 
labor taxation, as defined in (8) and (9), are estimated for the sample period 1959-1999 
and are reported in Table-7.  The total deadweight loss from the existing gasoline tax 
ranges from $397.9 millions in 1959 to $7162.8 millions in 1999, while the total 
deadweight loss from labor tax ranges from $7381.5 millions in 1959 to $205592.1 
millions in 1999. These levels can be considered as the additional tax revenues that could 
be collected with no social welfare loss if the existing taxes are replaced by 
nondistortionary lump sum taxation.  For the sake of comparison, the ratio of deadweight 
loss from gasoline tax to that of labor tax is also presented in Figure-2.  This ratio ranges 
from a minimum of 1.6 percent in 1981 to a maximum of about 6 percent in 1960.    
 
Similarly, in Table-7, the average deadweight loss represents the monetary value of 
the efficiency loss per dollar of tax revenue collected.  In the case of gasoline, it has a 
minimum level of 0.0656 in 1981 when the lowest tax rate, 13.9 percent, are imposed 
during the sample period. The average loss per dollar collected from gasoline tax has an 
increasing trend in recent years. For labor taxation, the average deadweight loss has a 
minimum of 0.1122 in 1960 and a maximum of 0.1471 in 1983. For the marginal 
deadweight loss of the existing gasoline tax regime, a dollar increase in tax revenue 
induces a positive range of changes in total deadweight loss from 0.1493 to 0.2521. The 
marginal deadweight loss of labor tax ranges from 0.1786 to 0.2610.  In most years of the 
sample period, the measures of marginal deadweight loss of labor tax are relatively large 
compared to those of gasoline tax. This implies a larger efficiency gain in the case of 
labor taxation in shifting from the existing distortionary taxation to lump sum taxation.
22 
 
However, as mentioned before, these results do not tell the whole story of the 
relationship between tax reform and social welfare. It should be noted that the 
deadweight costs of gasoline and labor taxation are not accounted for solely by the partial 
equilibrium approaches. In this study, we are abstracted from many other considerations. 
Much of these welfare costs due to taxation could be more closely explained in the 
context of general equilibrium approaches, incorporating the dynamics of capital markets, 
the flexibility and responsiveness of the whole economy, the openness of the economy, 
imperfect factor mobility, other pre-existing distortions, and distributional considerations, 






                                                           
22 In theory, the welfare effects of reducing one tax at the expense of raising another tax, holding total tax 
revenues constant, depend critically on the relative magnitude of marginal deadweight loss of each of these 
taxes. If there exists wide differences between the marginal deadweight loss burdens of gasoline and labor 
taxes, we may have a scope for tax reform from one to the other so as to enhance economic welfare. 
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     Table-7. Deadweight Loss of Gasoline and Labor Taxes – Actual Tax Regime  
   Deadweight Loss of Gasoline Tax Deadweight Loss of Labor Tax 
   Total Average  Marginal  Total Average  Marginal 
Year        (millions $)         (millions $)    
1959  397.9 0.0799  0.1676  7381.5 0.1141  0.1798 
1960  445.6 0.0796  0.1577  7871.2 0.1122  0.1786 
1961  511.1 0.0843  0.1539  8523.1 0.1190  0.1785 
1962  527.8 0.0833  0.1543  9211.6 0.1185  0.1796 
1963  557.3 0.0841  0.1530  10029.5 0.1196  0.1801 
1964  560.2 0.0799  0.1535  10138.6 0.1185  0.1826 
1965  558.3 0.0760  0.1522  10626.4 0.1175  0.1851 
1966  649.0 0.0828  0.1507  12427.3 0.1129  0.1827 
1967  746.3 0.0912  0.1514  14787.0 0.1219  0.1832 
1968  829.6 0.0962  0.1555  17131.0 0.1257  0.1852 
1969  928.7 0.0997  0.1548  19337.6 0.1234  0.1852 
1970  1059.7 0.1029  0.1531  21101.6 0.1344  0.1878 
1971  1113.9 0.1028  0.1571  23633.1 0.1438  0.1915 
1972  1204.6 0.1027  0.1589  26232.3 0.1379  0.1923 
1973  1261.3 0.0978  0.1522  28381.7 0.1316  0.1941 
1974  1191.4 0.0893  0.1493  31581.0 0.1306  0.1988 
1975  1130.7 0.0848  0.1649  35095.4 0.1447  0.2054 
1976  1138.0 0.0815  0.1727  39081.9 0.1413  0.2089 
1977  1181.5 0.0801  0.1825  44033.1 0.1409  0.2124 
1978  1250.8 0.0825  0.1994  49450.4 0.1363  0.2149 
1979  1204.3 0.0753  0.1921  54963.8 0.1311  0.2201 
1980  1078.9 0.0679  0.2033  61221.3 0.1354  0.2267 
1981  1042.5 0.0658  0.2209  66871.1 0.1346  0.2313 
1982  1196.0 0.0709  0.2370  75041.9 0.1464  0.2337 
1983  1237.0 0.0689  0.2521  78293.1 0.1471  0.2362 
1984  1738.9 0.0704  0.2078  83380.6 0.1421  0.2364 
1985  2064.2 0.0768  0.2078  95518.0 0.1410  0.2398 
1986  2410.6 0.0878  0.2384  101329.8 0.1491  0.2379 
1987  2666.2 0.0890  0.2298  107085.6 0.1456  0.2391 
1988  2942.8 0.0913  0.2330  115393.8 0.1458  0.2406 
1989  2978.8 0.0902  0.2337  122325.3 0.1424  0.2436 
1990  3063.4 0.0925  0.2318  129927.3 0.1365  0.2475 
1991  3805.5 0.0995  0.2218  137848.2 0.1386  0.2476 
1992  4351.5 0.1016  0.2102  144344.5 0.1381  0.2482 
1993  4352.4 0.0979  0.2159  149359.3 0.1349  0.2506 
1994  5051.2 0.0978  0.1986  154134.1 0.1340  0.2501 
1995  5534.3 0.1065  0.1946  165829.0 0.1360  0.2518 
1996  5260.2 0.1019  0.1954  172872.2 0.1329  0.2557 
1997  5532.9 0.1028  0.1947  178276.2 0.1272  0.2574 
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VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper was motivated by the need to provide more reasonable estimates for the 
welfare cost of environmental tax reform. Unlike most previous studies that empirically 
evaluate the deadweight loss of taxation, the model employed here considers explicitly 
the joint allocation of leisure and commodity demands where the wage rate plays a role 
both as a form of income and as the price of leisure time.   
In Section V, we see that the energy-related tax such as gasoline tax could 
contribute to energy conservation for the U.S. economy. The estimated results of the 
consumer behavior model indicate that for the U.S. economy, the existing gasoline tax 
regime has induced a decrease of gasoline consumption by approximately 4 percent over 
the period from 1959 to 1999. The deadweight loss caused by the gasoline tax accounts 
for about 0.08 percent of the consumer full income over the sample period. Moreover, in 
most years of the sample period, the measures of marginal deadweight loss of gasoline 
taxation (sample average 0.1882) are relatively small compared to those of labor taxation 
(sample average 0.2175). This implies a larger efficiency gain in the case of labor 
taxation in shifting from the existing distortionary taxation to lump sum taxation.  These 
results might suggest the modest possibility of social welfare gains from tax reforms that 
shift some of the burden of taxation off labor onto energy such as gasoline, taking into 
account the relationship between energy use and environmental benefits.  
Nonetheless, some limitations to this study deserve mention.  In estimating 
measures of deadweight loss due to taxation, first, this study assumes a representative 
consumer and thus uses only the aggregated time series data with the cost of unknown 
aggregation biases over consumers. The non-energy products in the model are also highly 
aggregated, neglecting the possibilities that some commodities such as housing, 
transportation, and other capital services are closely correlated to individual types of 
energy or non-market leisure time. Second, the model used is static, ignoring the inter-
temporal choice by consumers and the dynamics of capital markets. In other words, the 
allocation of capital is frozen during each year over the sample period. The deadweight 
loss of energy taxation would also crucially depend on the relative preexisting tax 
distortions of labor and capital. The tax burden from energy-related taxes might interact 
more with the relatively overtaxed capital market in the U.S. economy. For instance, if 
the energy sector is more capital intensive, environmentally-targeted tax policies could 
shift more of the burden toward capital. Finally, the analysis in this paper does not 
incorporate the flexibility and responsiveness of the whole economy and any 
distributional considerations, which would still affect monetary measures of welfare costs 
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